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Article
Confronting the Wizard of Oz:
National Security, Expertise, and Secrecy
DAVID COLE
Aziz Rana’s account of the takeover of American national security by experts, and of the
public’s acceptance of that state of affairs, offers an important and novel perspective on what
ails us in national security today. In this Comment, I suggest that while Rana is correct to
identify our deference to experts as a central aspect of the problem, the problem is more
complicated. First, the phenomenon of elite control over foreign and security policy questions is
not new, but likely dates back to the founding—when elites ruled not based on expertise but on
the basis of status, class, and legal barriers to more popular input. Second, deference to
expertise is not just an ideological assumption of the modern age, but is also a rational response
to greater threats and increased complexity. Third, deference may rest as much on secrecy as it
does on epistemological assumptions about national security information. Because of
classification, the general public often lacks not just expertise, but the very facts necessary to
make an informed assessment.
That said, Rana’s reminder of the importance of popular decision-making on national
security policy is an important one. Unwarranted deference to experts (especially when they
make judgments on secret information) not only undermines democratic legitimacy, but may
induce poor decision-making, by facilitating groupthink and other biases. And most importantly,
decisions about national security are never only about national security; they nearly always
implicate other values, such as privacy, liberty, or human dignity. The national security experts
have no expertise in assessing the normative questions that conflicts with these values raise.
Those normative questions must be made by us all.
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Confronting the Wizard of Oz:
National Security, Expertise, and Secrecy
DAVID COLE*
When I need to use the remote control for our television, I call my
fifteen-year old son. It’s not exactly that I am incapable of understanding
the remote (or at least I don’t think so). It’s just that he’s so much better at
it, has so much more experience with it, and I use it so infrequently that I
defer to his expertise. Aziz Rana’s account of the American public’s
relationship to national security tells a similar story. The public, he argues,
has deferred to the executive branch, and in particular to the national
security agencies therein, on questions of security.1 In his view, this
deference reflects an epistemological shift, from a period when we viewed
knowledge about security matters to be equally accessible by everyone, to
the modern period in which we have delegated responsibility to a relatively
small and insulated coterie of “experts” in the executive branch.2 No
constitutional concerns are implicated by my delegation of the remote to
my son. But the public’s delegation of national security matters to the socalled experts, Rana maintains, has profound implications for
constitutional democracy.3 Until we learn to use the remote, we will never
be masters of our own destiny.
Rana’s account of the epistemological underpinnings of the national
security state offers an astute and novel perspective on a familiar story.
Few would dispute that the national security agenda is today dominated by
agencies in the executive branch.4 Other scholars have identified different
causes for this development. Many have pointed to such factors as the
growth of the administrative state; the increasingly interventionist role the
United States plays in the world; the rise of technological threats such as
*

Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1417, 1422–23 (2012).
2
Id.
3
Id. at 1420–22.
4
Actually, there are some who do dispute this. Former Vice President Richard Cheney, and his
right-hand man David Addington, believe that the executive has been too hemmed in by legal
restrictions since the Watergate and Vietnam era. Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Attorney General
Held Firm on War Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2007, at A1. Jack Goldsmith, who served as a top
lawyer in the Bush administration, also maintains that the executive branch generally, and especially on
matters of national security, has never before been so legally regulated and controlled. JACK
GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 64–70 (2007). But this plainly is a minority view, and certainly
seems to be have been belied by the actions of the Bush administration itself.
1
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nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; the spread of international
terrorism; and the risks posed by the increasing interconnectedness of the
globalized world.5 But Rana adds a further dimension, attributing the
evolution to a shift in how the American public thinks about national
security. In his view, the modern era has erroneously accepted the view
that security matters should be left to “the experts.”6 Until we successfully
challenge that assumption, he contends, legal reforms addressed to the
problem are doomed to fail.7
Rana is right to focus our attention on the assumptions that frame
modern Americans’ conceptions about national security, but his
assessment raises three initial questions. First, it seems far from clear that
there ever was a “golden” era in which national security decisions were
made by the common man, or “the people themselves,” as Larry Kramer
might put it.8 Rana argues that neither Hobbes nor Locke would support a
worldview in which certain individuals are vested with superior access to
the truth, and that faith in the superior abilities of so-called “experts” is a
phenomenon of the New Deal era.9 While an increased faith in scientific
solutions to social problems may be a contributing factor in our current
overreliance on experts,10 I doubt that national security matters were ever
truly a matter of widespread democratic deliberation.
Rana notes that in the early days of the republic, every able-bodied
man had to serve in the militia, whereas today only a small (and largely
disadvantaged) portion of society serves in the military.11 But serving in
the militia and making decisions about national security are two different
matters. The early days of the Republic were at least as dominated by
“elites” as today. Rana points to no evidence that decisions about foreign
5
See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 11 (2010) (discussing the power of the executive branch to steer the agenda of
the legislature or act unilaterally); Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Epilogue to ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.,
THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 420, 420–21 (2004) (stating that the powers of president to dictate foreign
relations have grown unchecked in the last fifty years); GARRY WILLS, BOMB POWER: THE MODERN
PRESIDENT AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 1 (2010) (“Only one part of the government had the
supreme power, the Bomb, and all else must defer to it, for the good of the nation, for the good of the
world, for the custody of the future, in a world of perpetual emergency superseding ordinary
constitutional restrictions.”); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE
L.J. 1385, 1402–04 (1989) (discussing how the proliferation of nuclear weapons elevated the powers of
the executive so as to respond to an emergency).
6
Rana, supra note 1, at 1476.
7
Id. at 1483.
8
See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2004) (arguing that the common people of the United States have a pivotal role in
constitutional law).
9
Rana, supra note 1, at 1426, 1448.
10
Id. at 1452.
11
Id. at 1437–38; see also Ann Scott Tyson, Youths in Rural U.S. Are Drawn to Military, WASH.
POST, Nov. 4, 2005, at A1.
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affairs were any more democratic then than now. And, of course, the
nation as a whole was far less democratic, as the majority of its inhabitants
could not vote at all.12 Rather than moving away from a golden age of
democratic decision-making, it seems more likely that we have simply
replaced one group of elites (the aristocracy) with another (the experts).
Second, to the extent that there has been an epistemological shift with
respect to national security, it seems likely that it is at least in some
measure a response to objective conditions, not just an ideological
development. If so, it’s not clear that we can solve the problem merely by
“thinking differently” about national security. The world has, in fact,
become more interconnected and dangerous than it was when the
Constitution was drafted. At our founding, the oceans were a significant
buffer against attacks, weapons were primitive, and travel over long
distances was extremely arduous and costly. The attacks of September 11,
2001, or anything like them, would have been inconceivable in the
eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. Small groups of non-state actors can
now inflict the kinds of attacks that once were the exclusive province of
states. But because such actors do not have the governance responsibilities
that states have, they are less susceptible to deterrence. The Internet makes
information about dangerous weapons and civil vulnerabilities far more
readily available, airplane travel dramatically increases the potential range
of a hostile actor, and it is not impossible that terrorists could obtain and
use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.13 The knowledge necessary
to monitor nuclear weapons, respond to cyber warfare, develop
technological defenses to technological threats, and gather intelligence is
increasingly specialized. The problem is not just how we think about
security threats; it is also at least in part objectively based.
Third, deference to expertise is not always an error; sometimes it is a
rational response to complexity. Expertise is generally developed by
devoting substantial time and attention to a particular set of problems. We
cannot possibly be experts in everything that concerns us. So I defer to my
son on the remote control, to my wife on directions (and so much else), to
the plumber on my leaky faucet, to the electrician when the wiring starts to
fail, to my doctor on my back problems, and to my mutual fund manager
on investments. I could develop more expertise in some of these areas, but
that would mean less time teaching, raising a family, writing, swimming,
12
See Ed Crews, Voting in Early America, COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG OFFICIAL HISTORY SITE,
http://www.history.org/foundation/journal/spring07/elections.cfm (last visited Mar. 20, 2012) (“[B]y
modern standards, the right to vote in colonial American was narrow, and there were fewer
opportunities for its exercise.”).
13
CTR. FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION RES., NAT’L DEF. UNIV., CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,
RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM: THE THREAT ACCORDING TO THE CURRENT
UNCLASSIFIED LITERATURE 1 (2002).
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and listening to music. The same is true, in greater or lesser degrees, for
all of us. And it is true at the level of the national community, not only for
national security, but for all sorts of matters. We defer to the
Environmental Protection Agency on environmental matters, to the Federal
Reserve Board on monetary policy, to the Department of Agriculture on
how best to support farming, and to the Federal Aviation Administration
and the Transportation Security Administration on how best to make air
travel safe. Specialization is not something unique to national security. It
is a rational response to an increasingly complex world in which we cannot
possibly spend the time necessary to gain mastery over all that affects our
daily lives.
If our increasing deference to experts on national security issues is in
part the result of objective circumstances, in part a rational response to
complexity, and not necessarily less “elitist” than earlier times, then it is
not enough to “think differently” about the issue. We may indeed need to
question the extent to which we rely on experts, but surely there is a role
for expertise when it comes to assessing threats to critical infrastructure,
devising ways to counter those threats, and deploying technology to secure
us from technology’s threats. As challenging as it may be to adjust our
epistemological framework, it seems likely that even if we were able to
sheer away all the unjustified deference to “expertise,” we would still need
to rely in substantial measure on experts.
The issue, in other words, is not whether to rely on experts, but how to
do so in a way that nonetheless retains some measure of self-government.
The need for specialists need not preclude democratic decision-making.
Consider, for example, the model of adjudication. Trials involving
products liability, antitrust, patents, and a wide range of other issues
typically rely heavily on experts.14 But critically, the decision is not left to
the experts. The decision rests with the jury or judge, neither of whom
purports to be an expert. Experts testify, but do so in a way that allows for
adversarial testing and requires them to explain their conclusions to
laypersons, who render judgment informed, but not determined, by the
expert testimony.
Similarly, Congress routinely acts on matters over which its members
are not experts. Congress enacts laws governing a wide range of very
complex issues, yet expertise is not a qualification for office. Members of
14
See Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges?
The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, 54 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 1–3
(2011) (discussing the “expert witness boom in antitrust and a handful of other areas over the last
several decades”); M. Neil Browne et al., The Epistemological Role of Expert Witnesses and Toxic
Torts, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 1–4 (1998) (discussing the frequent use of expert witness testimony in
litigation involving hazardous products); Michael H. Jester, Patent Law Experts: Their Selection and
Role in Patent Litigation, INTEL. PROP. TODAY, Dec. 2004, at 32 (explaining importance of patent law
experts in patent litigation).
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Congress, like many political appointees in the executive branch, listen to
and consider the views of experts to inform their decisions. Congress
delegates initial consideration of most problems to committees, and by
serving on those committees and devoting time and attention to the
problems within their ambit, members develop a certain amount of
expertise themselves. They may hire staff who have still greater expertise,
and they hold hearings in which they invite testimony from still other
experts. But at the end of the day, the decisions about what laws should be
passed are made by the Congress as a whole, not by the experts.
A similar process operates in the executive branch. The President and
Vice-President generally need not be experts in any particular field, and
many of the cabinet members they appoint are not necessarily experts
either. They are managers and policy makers. They spend much of their
day being briefed by people with more specialized expertise than they
have. But at the end of the day, the important decisions are made by
politically accountable actors.
Thus, deference to experts need not preclude independent or
democratically accountable decision-making. The larger problem may be
one that Rana notes but does not sufficiently emphasize—an inordinate
reliance on classified information and covert operations.15 Secrecy is in
many ways the ultimate enemy of democracy in the national security
realm.16 As Judge Damon Keith has written, “democracy dies behind
closed doors.”17 The experts in the intelligence community have the power
to hide their decisions from external review and checks by classifying the
information they consider or the actions they take.18 Even if they do so in
good faith, the inevitable result is that their actions are increasingly
insulated from scrutiny by others and immune from democratic checks.
Virtually everyone who has had access to classified information concedes
that the system leads to massive over-classification.19 Our overreliance on
secrecy may well be more central to the problem of inordinate deference
than assumptions about the nature of knowledge regarding security. And
15
See Rana, supra note 1, at 1475–76 (describing the vast secret security infrastructure in the
United States).
16
See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY 154, 165–66 (1998) (asserting that a culture of
secrecy developed in response to concerns about the Communist Party, which resulted in a closed
society that fell far short of democratic ideals and security programs that were inadequate and
uncoordinated).
17
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (invalidating secret
immigration hearing for detainee apprehended in the wake of terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001).
18
See ELIZABETH GOITEIN & DAVID M. SHAPIRO, BRENNAN CTR. JUST., REDUCING
OVERCLASSIFICATION THROUGH ACCOUNTABILITY 12 (2011) (explaining that original classifier—the
first people to classify information—“are the only officials empowered to determine what information
merits classification”).
19
Id.; see generally DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF
THE NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE (2011).
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in any event, the problems are mutually reinforcing. The inaccessibility of
the information the experts rely upon compels us to defer to them because
we lack sufficient grounds to question them. And that, in turn, may well
make the experts more protective of their information and more likely to
classify their actions, decisions, and considerations.
If this analysis is correct, then we must overcome not only the
epistemological problem that Rana cites, but the problem of overreliance
on secrecy as well. Experts can inform rather than supplant democratic
decision-making only if we treat national security questions as appropriate
for public deliberation, and if there is sufficient transparency to permit the
decisions to be adequately informed.
Rana stakes his claim for change on democratic legitimacy. Leaving
such important decisions to unelected “experts” cannot be squared with the
democratic foundations upon which our society rests, he argues.20 But
there are at least two additional reasons, beyond democratic legitimacy, for
resisting wholesale deference to the national security experts. First, many
of the decisions that must be made in the security field involve more than
questions of security. Surveillance issues, for example, almost inevitably
involve a weighing of privacy interests against security concerns.
Interrogation practices require us to balance the need for intelligence
against interests in respecting human dignity and autonomy. Detention
questions inevitably require a balancing of liberty and security. National
security experts may well have expertise with respect to the security side of
the equation on such questions, but there is no reason to think that they are
experts in privacy, liberty, or human dignity. Indeed, precisely because of
their specialized focus on security, they are ill-suited to weigh other
concerns against security concerns. As Justice David Souter wrote in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld:21
In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on
what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether
in peace or war (or some condition in between) is not well
entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose
particular responsibility is to maintain security. For
reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the
Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the
branch on which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in
striking the balance between the will to win and the cost in
liberty on the way to victory; the responsibility for security
will naturally amplify the claim that security legitimately
20
21

Rana, supra note 1, at 1425.
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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raises. A reasonable balance is more likely to be reached
on the judgment of a different branch . . . .22
How one strikes the balance between liberty and security is a decision
that may be informed by experts, but is ultimately a normative question
about the kind of society we want to live in—and that is quintessentially
not a decision for experts, but for the people.
Second, even if we bracketed the oft-competing rights concerns, and
all we cared about was effective security, deference to experts operating
with secret information behind closed doors might well be
counterproductive. Experts are in no way immune from groupthink and
other decisional biases, and the smaller the circle of actors with the
requisite knowledge to act, the less likely it is that such errors will be
corrected.23 Moreover, as the 9/11 Commission found, barriers to the
sharing of information can greatly undermine the soundness of security
strategies.24 Stovepiping is an inevitable consequence of specialization and
classification (because only those with a clearance and a “need to know”
can then gain access to the information), and makes it less likely that even
the experts themselves will have access to all the information relevant to
their decisions.25 Thus, greater transparency may be a benefit not merely
from the vantage point of democratic legitimacy, as Rana illustrates, but
also from the normative perspective of striking an appropriate balance, and
from the pragmatic standpoint of improving security.
Rana calls our attention to some of the deep philosophical
undercurrents that have come to define modern attitudes toward national
security. The issues are too important to be left to experts, but until we
challenge our assumptions about the propriety of doing so, he argues, no
formal legal solution will succeed. I am sympathetic to Rana’s concerns,
and seek to support his argument with the three principal points made here.
First, it is critical to consider the particular role that secrecy, itself
controlled by experts, plays in constructing and perpetuating “expertise,”
and in shielding the experts from democratic assessment. Second, when it
comes to weighing security against other values, such as privacy, liberty,
and human dignity, the experts deserve skepticism, not deference. And
third, security decisions themselves are often undermined by the barriers
that secrecy and specialization raise. Like the Wizard of Oz, national
security experts operate behind a large screen, and that screen bars us from
22

Id. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment).
See Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror,
97 CAL. L. REV. 301, 323 (2009) (arguing that security decision-making is often skewed by biases that
might be counteracted through exposure to other perspectives and viewpoints).
24
NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 416
(2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
25
Id. at 417.
23
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realizing, as Rana insists, that we are all capable of making the necessarily
normative judgments about security and liberty that implicate not only the
survival of our polity, but its survival in the form we choose.

